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This study attempts to isolate the underlying processing resources of visual attention from the ‘cognitive
supervision’—working memory, decision processes, but especially awareness—that typically accompanies
their allocation. To decouple them, we used the motion aftereffect (MAE) as a passive assay of resource
allocation. In our main condition, observers were presented with an adapting ﬁeld, but did not attend to
it. Instead their effort was directed to an engrossing auditory two-back memory task. Consequently,
observers had no consistent awareness of the adaptor, nor were able to make accurate judgements about
its luminance, but nonetheless had MAE’s no smaller than those induced when the adaptor was ‘fully
attended’. Similarly to when object- or feature-based attention spreads unwittingly, attention was allo-
cated automatically to the adaptor, without requiring nor engaging executive control or awareness.
 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
At least sinceWilliam James described attention as ‘‘...the taking
possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of what
seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought.
Focalization, concentration, of consciousness are of its essence....”
(James, 1890),‘attention’—the selective enhancement and prioriti-
zation of behaviorally relevant information (Treue, 2003)—and
‘awareness’—the real-time, conscious experience of a stimulus—
have been tightly entwined. Though the two have been distin-
guished (Bahrami, Carmel, Walsh, Rees, & Lavie, 2008; Hardcastle,
1997; Kentridge, Heywood, & Weiskrantz, 2004; Koch & Tsuchiya,
2007; Naccache, Blandin, & Dehaene, 2002), it can still seem a par-
adox to speak of attending to something without being aware of it
or, vice versa, to have a proximal stimulus enter awareness with-
out attending to it (Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache, Sackur, & Ser-
gent, 2006; He, Cavanagh, & Intriligator, 1996; Lamme, 2003;
Merikle & Joordens, 1997; O’Regan, & Noe, 2001; Posner,1994; Vel-
mans, 1996). This though leads to a contradiction. If attention and
awareness are coupled, this implies visual awareness too must be
necessary for the processes for which attention is thought neces-
sary, such as ‘object binding’ (Treisman & Gelade, 1980), memory
gating (Sperling, 1960), ‘serial’ visual search (Treisman & Gelade,
1980; Wolfe, Cave, & Franzel, 1989), and much of object detection
(where attention misallocation is thought to induce ‘inattentional
blindness’ (Mack & Rock, 1998) and ‘change blindness’ (Rensink,
O’Reagan, & Clark, 1997; Simons & Levin, 1997), just to name a
few. In short this means without visual awareness we would bell rights reserved.effectively blind; yet many regular commuters, lost in thought, ar-
rive home without incident.
A relatively new line of experimental evidence also points to the
necessity of better distinguishing attention from awareness. In
these attention-spreading effects, performance or responses of
neurons is not just affected at explicitly attended locations (Con-
nor, Preddie, Gallant, & Van Essen, 1997), but also winds up af-
fected elsewhere unwittingly and automatically. For instance,
consider ‘cross-attribute’ attention where, for example, attending
to the color of a ﬁeld of drifting dots induces attention to their mo-
tion (Sohn, Papathomas, Blaser, & Vidnyanszky, 2004), ‘feature-
based attention spreading’, where attention to a feature at one
location induces global attention effects to like-features beyond
this intended focus, for instance when attention to motion in one
location inﬂuences the responses of similarly tuned neurons in
other locations (Arman, Ciaramitaro, & Boynton, 2006; Melcher,
Papathomas, & Vidnyanszky, 2005; Saenz, Buracas, & Boynton,
2002; Serences & Boynton, 2007; Treue & Martinez Trujillo,
1999; Treue & Maunsell, 1996), and ‘object-based attention’ where
attention devoted to one feature of an object triggers attention to
all of its concomitant features (Blaser, Pylyshyn, & Holcombe,
2000; Duncan, 1984; O’Craven, Downing, & Kanwisher, 1999); all
of this shows that there is muchmore to attention than the thin ve-
neer of what we direct it to do, and what we are aware of it having
done.
Our goal here is to divorce visual processing resources from the
executive, central bottleneck processes (Pashler & Jhonston,
1998)—working memory, decision, but especially awareness—that
typically accompany their allocation. In this way we can observe
how resources are allocated when unsupervised. In practice it is
notoriously difﬁcult to tease the two apart (‘‘Please attend solely
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green dots on the right”). To measure resource allocation without
inﬂuencing it, we used the magnitude of the motion aftereffect
(MAE) as a passive assay.
1.1. Attention and the MAE
In 1911, Wolhgemuth had observers view a moving stimulus in
his effort to induce and quantify the duration of the MAE (Wohlge-
muth, 1911), an illusion of movement now thought to reﬂect an
imbalance in the relative responses of direction-selective cortical
neurons induced by prolonged viewing of an adapting motion
stimulus (Mather, 1980; Sutherland, 1961; Mather and Harris,
1998). He noted signiﬁcant MAE’s. In a separate condition designed
to assess the inﬂuence attention on this effect, he had them again
view the adapting motion stimulus, but asked them to concentrate
on a mental arithmetic task. He noted no change in MAE durations.
However, nearly a century later, Chaudhuri (1990) performed a
similar study, with very different results. In a condition where
observers diverted their attention to an RSVP (Sperling, Budiansky,
Spivak, & Johnson, 1971) task at ﬁxation he found drastic—on aver-
age 50%—reductions in MAE durations relative to when observers
passively viewed the adapting ﬁeld of dots (Fig. 1).
A large body of subsequent behavioral (Alais & Blake, 1999;
Georgiades & Harris, 2000; Lankheet & Verstraten, 1995; Rezec,
Krekelberg, & Dobkins, 2004; von Grünau, Bertone, & Pakneshan,
1998) and neurophysiological (Berman & Colby, 2002; Huk, Ress,
& Heeger, 2001; Rees, Frith, & Lavie, 1997; Seiffert, Somers, Dale,
& Tootell, 2003) studies have conﬁrmed Chaudhuri’s (1990) basic
result: attending to an adapting motion stimulus maximizes
MAE’s, while diverting it minimizes them.
1.2. Isolating ‘dark attention’
The term ‘attention’ is imprecise. Some visual processing re-
sources may be willfully directed, as when the observer executes
an instruction or implements a top-down allocation strategy, but
there are circumstances—the vast majority of circumstances, we
would argue—when there is a context-dependent, ﬂexible shut-Fig. 1. Main results reprinted from Chaudhuri (1990). This graph shows MAE
duration for ﬁve observers under two attentional conditions: a passive condition
where observers simply viewed the motion adaptation stimulus (a laterally drifting
noise ﬁeld) and a withdrawn attention condition where observers were asked to
perform an RSVP task at ﬁxation during adaptation. In this condition, MAE
durations dropped on average 50%. We replicate this main effect, but using a true
dual-task paradigm, in Experiment 1.tling of resources between visual stimuli, but that neither re-
quires nor engages executive control or awareness. We refer to
this as the shadow economy of ‘dark attention’. This is not a pro-
posal of new mechanism of attention per se, but an explicit dis-
tinction between cases where resources are willfully allocated,
and cases where allocation occurs unsupervised. In our main
experiment, we try to divert only the panoply of cognitive and
conscious processes away from a visual stimulus, to remove
supervision from the underlying processing resources, thereby
isolating dark attention.
In our main conditions observers were presented with an
adapting ﬁeld of moving dots while performing two tasks con-
currently (Braun & Sagi, 1990; Sperling & Melchner, 1978). One
task required observers to make judgments about the luminance
of the adapting ﬁeld, while the other required observers to mon-
itor a stream of numerals to perform a two-back memory task.
Observers were instructed how to distribute their effort between
the two tasks (e.g. ‘‘give 90% of your effort to the two-back task,
10% to luminance”). These instructions were designed to induce
tradeoffs in awareness through concomitant, measurable trade-
offs in task-relevant cognitive processes, such as working
memory.
Importantly, we presented the two-back task in two different
modalities. In our main experiment, the two-back task was pre-
sented auditorially (a spoken stream of numerals presented over
headphones) to eliminate demands on visual processing resources
(Duncan, Martens, & Ward, 1997; Treisman & Davies, 1973) while
maximizing cognitive demands (Brand-D’Abrescia and Lavie,
2008). In a contrasting experiment designed as a basic replication
of Chaudhuri, the two-back task was presented visually (an RSVP
stream of numerals presented at ﬁxation), thereby invoking signif-
icant, likely zero-sum visual demands. In both experiments, we
used the magnitude of the motion aftereffect (MAE) as a passive
assay resources allocated to the adapting ﬁeld.
We found that instructions to weight one task or the other did
indeed induce tradeoffs in performance between the two tasks.
Critically, this was true for both the visual version and the audi-
tory modalities. Given the previous results on attention and the
MAE, it is tempting then to expect then that MAE’s would be
weaker when observers’ effort was diverted from the luminance
task to (either of) the two-back tasks. Consistent with this predic-
tion, MAE’s did drop considerably when effort was devoted pri-
marily to the visual two-back task at ﬁxation, away from the
luminance task on the adapting ﬁeld. However, in sharp contrast,
MAE’s were undiminished when effort was directed to the audi-
tory two-back task: In a condition where observers ignored the
adapting ﬁeld and instead devoted themselves to an engrossing
alternate task—and as a consequence had no consistent aware-
ness of the adapting ﬁeld and no ability to make judgments about
its luminance—MAE’s nonetheless were no smaller than those in-
duced in a condition where the adaptor was fully ‘attended’. We
take this as evidence that a resource—dark attention—was none-
theless allocated to the adaptor, automatically and unsupervised,
supporting normal motion processing and therefore maximal
MAE’s.2. Methods
2.1. Observers
Six observers (4 naive and 2 expert) with normal or corrected-
to-normal vision participated in these experiments. Informed writ-
ten consent was obtained from all observers. Naive observers were
University of Massachusetts Boston undergraduate students, who
were paid $8.00/h for their participation.
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Stimuli were displayed on a ViewSonic PF790 monitor run-
ning at 640  480 and 120 Hz. Presentation and response col-
lection were controlled with VisionShell software running on
an Apple Mac G4. Observers sat in a darkened room and
viewed the monitor from a distance of 57 cm, with head posi-
tion stabilized by a chin rest. Depending on condition, some
stimuli were presented visually and/or auditorially, through
headphones. Observers made responses through keystrokes
and/or spoken responses into a microphone positioned under
the chin rest.
2.3. MAE stimuli
Stimuli consisted of 512 small (2 arc min) dots randomly dis-
tributed on a dark background. Dot patterns were presented in
an aperture with a diameter of 11 deg, yielding a dot density
of 5 dots per sq. deg. During stimulus presentation, observers
were instructed to ﬁxate on a small central cross. During adap-
tation, stimuli drifted laterally with a speed of 3 deg/s and
100% coherence, and a limited lifetime of 317 ms. The ﬁeld ofFig. 3. Trace of roving luminance used for plateau detection task. The luminance of th
performing the ‘plateau detection’ task, observers monitored this roving for ﬂat spots - b
plateaus in a typical 30 s trial.
Fig. 2. Example trial. Every trial in both Experiment 1 and 2 consisted of two main phas
were presented with a drifting ﬁeld of limited lifetime dots. This ﬁeld also had dynamica
During this phase, observers were asked to perform two tasks concurrently: a ‘plateau’ de
changes, see Fig. 3) and a two-back memory task (where observers monitored a stream
auditorially, over headphones. At the end of the 30 s adaptation period (the ﬁrst trial of
entered the test phase. In the test phase, observers were presented with a physically stat
ﬁeld reached perceptual standstill, and then pressed a button to initiate the next trial. T
duration and served as our measure of MAE strength, consistent with the measure useddots also changed luminance dynamically—in unison, randomly
but smoothly—between a dim but supra-threshold 3 cd/m2 to
the monitor’s maximum luminance of 164 cd/m2 (please see
Fig. 3 for an example trace; this dynamic luminance was rele-
vant to one of our tasks, described below). Adaptation lasted
60 s for the ﬁrst trial of a block and 30 s for subsequent trials.
When the adaptation period ended, there was a 500 ms blank
interval and then the test period began. The test stimulus was
similar to the adaptation ﬁeld, but the dots were now physically
static, inﬁnite lifetime and displayed at a ﬁxed mid-range lumi-
nance of 84 cd/m2. During the presentation of the test stimulus,
the observer was likely to experience an MAE. When an observer
judged that the MAE had ended and the ﬁeld had reached a per-
ceptual standstill, she pressed a key to terminate the trial. MAE
duration was deﬁned as the elapsed time from the beginning of
the test interval to this keypress (Fig. 2).
Duration was used as a measure of MAE magnitude to match
the measure used by Wohlgemuth (1911) and Chaudhuri (1990).
(It is worth noting here that we ran pilot experiments to determine
if the use of limited-lifetime or inﬁnite-lifetime ‘static’ dots in our
test stimuli affected our pattern of results. As we found no differ-
ence, we used static ﬁelds; we have noticed that naive observerse adapting dots varied randomly, but smoothly between 3 and 164 cd/m2. When
rief periods when the dots stayed at a ﬁxed luminance. There were roughly 7 such
es, adaptation and test. During the adaptation phase, observers ﬁxated centrally and
lly roving luminance, with all dots simultaneously randomly, but smoothly, varying.
tection task (where observers monitored for brief pauses in the dynamic luminance
of numerals for two-back repeats) that was presented either visually, at ﬁxation, or
every block was 60 s), a short blank period appeared for 500 ms, and then the trial
ionary ﬁeld of inﬁnite lifetime dots. Observers judged when the illusory drift of this
he time from the end of the blank ﬁeld to this button press was taken as the MAE
by Chaudhuri (1990) and Wohlgemuth (1911).
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standstill.)
2.4. Primary task: plateau detection (luminance judgments with
respect to the adapting ﬁeld)
Plateau detection required observers to monitor the luminance
changes in the adapting ﬁeld. Occasionally, the luminance of the
ﬁeld would stop changing for a brief period, then resume roving;
observers had to make speeded detections (through a keypress)
of these subtle, periodic plateaus. Plateaus lasted 1.5–2.5 s, and oc-
curred with ISI’s of 0.5–3.5 s, yielding about 7–8 plateaus in a 30 s
trial (Fig. 3).
A ‘hit’ was registered when the observer correctly identiﬁed a
plateau during its presentation, whereas a response outside of this
interval was coded as a ‘false alarm’. The failure to respond within
this interval was coded as a ‘miss’ while ‘correct rejections’ were
recorded when observers made no response during the intervals
between plateaus. These rates were used to compute percent cor-
rect performance. Observers received feedback only when a re-
sponse was made (the ﬁxation cross turned green for hits and
red for false alarms). The frequency and duration of these plateaus
had been previously calibrated in pilot experiments to yield a dif-
ﬁcult, engrossing task with performance levels on average at 50%
correct (corrected for guessing) for naive observers with a few
blocks of practice. This task is performed on the adapting ﬁeld itself
and is a dummy task of sorts, designed coax observers into fully
‘attending’ to the adapting ﬁeld.
2.5. Alternate task: visual or auditory two-back memory
The second task in this dual-task paradigm was two-back mem-
ory. This task was performed over a stream of numbers that was
presented either visually (in RSVP fashion, at ﬁxation) or auditori-
ally (via spoken numerals over headphones). Apart from presenta-
tion modality, task and parameters were identical. The numerals
1–5 were used, and were presented in random order at a rate of
about one numeral every 2 s (1850–2150 ms). Every time there
was a two-back repeat in the sequence—for instance of the numer-
al 3 in the sequence ‘‘...2 1 3 3 4 3 5 4...”—observers had to make a
speeded response (by speaking the word ‘yes’; observers made ver-
bal responses for both the visual and auditory versions of this task).
Responses immediately following a repeated numeral, before the
onset of the subsequent numeral, were coded as hits; other re-
sponses were coded as false alarms. Failure to respond within this
interval resulted in a miss, while correct rejections were coded
when observers withheld responses in the interval following a
non-repeated numeral. These rates were used to calculate percent
correct measures of performance.
2.6. General procedure
All trials consisted of an adaptation and test phase. During adap-
tation, observers were presented with the adaptation stimulus and
performed the plateau and/or the two-back task. In dual-task con-
ditions, observers could be given one of the following instructions
to ‘weight’ one task more strongly than the other: Give 100% of
your effort to the plateau task (single-task control); give 90% effort
to plateau detection, 10% to two-back memory; give 50%/50% effort
to each task; give 10% effort to plateau, 90% to two-back; give 100%
effort to two-back (single-task control). (In the dual-task condi-
tions, it is possible that there could be response interference be-
tween the two tasks. To rule this out, we performed a simple
control where the plateau task was replaced with a structurally
identical, but perceptually trivially easy, task: every time the rov-
ing dots entered a plateau, the dots ﬂashed red brieﬂy. Observerswere no worse at either task when performed together as when
each was performed alone—ruling out response-related interfer-
ence). Instructions were blocked and observers performed two
blocks of 10 trials each. MAE durations were measured in the test
phase of each trial, allowing us to measure how the instructed
biases between the two tasks would affect this measured MAE.
This all amounted to three measurements made for a typical
dual-task trial: performance on the plateau task, performance on
the two-back task, and MAE duration. Experiments 1 and 2, de-
scribed below, differed only in whether the two-back task was pre-
sented visually or auditorially.3. Results
3.1. Experiment 1: MAE’s induced during plateau detection or visual
two-back tasks
This experiment was designed as a minimal replication of Chau-
dhuri’s (1990) ﬁnding that withdrawing ‘attention’ from an adapt-
ing stimulus signiﬁcantly reduces the magnitude of the induced
MAE. For expediency, only the two single-task baseline conditions
were tested during the adaptation phase of each trial: the plateau
detection task alone during adaptation, or the two-back task alone
during adaptation. Observers ran three 10 trial blocks of each of
these conditions. In a conﬁrmation of Chaudhuri’s main result, a
naive and expert observer both showed signiﬁcant reductions in
MAE duration when effort was devoted to the visual two-back task
at ﬁxation, relative to when effort was devoted to plateau detection
on the adapting ﬁeld itself. Expert observer TS’s MAE dropped from
15.74 to 5.47 s, while naive observer AB’s MAE dropped from 7.61
to 5.74 s. Both the absolute durations of these MAE’s and the pro-
portional reductions are comparable to those found by Chaudhuri
(1990).
3.2. Experiment 2: MAE’s induced during dual-task: plateau detection
and auditory two-back
During the adaptation phase of each trial in this experiment,
observers performed both the plateau task and the auditory two-
back task concurrently. Instructions were given to observers to
manipulate the effort that they devoted to each of the two tasks.
This resulted in a total of ﬁve conditions, which were presented
in different blocks and in random order (each block contained a to-
tal of 10 trials, and observers ran two blocks of each condition).
These ﬁve conditions were: 100% effort to plateau detection (sin-
gle-task control), 90% effort to plateau detection and 10% effort
to auditory two-back, 50/50, 10/90, and 100% auditory two-back
(single-task control).
As hoped, there was a signiﬁcant tradeoff in performance be-
tween the two tasks as a function of pre-block instruction: observ-
ers did better when giving a task more effort, and showed an
inability to do both tasks at the same time without loss (with the
exception of observer AB). While of course there are tasks which
do not compete for resources (like walking and chewing gum)
these two tasks do show signiﬁcant tradeoffs in performance, as
seen in the average and individual attention operating characteris-
tics (AOC’s; Sperling & Melchner, 1978) (Fig. 4). (Unfortunately, our
data is not ﬁne-grained enough to allow us to make any strong
statements about whether these tradeoffs reﬂect a sharing of cog-
nitive resources between the two tasks, or a switching of resources.
What we can say is that performance on a trial-by-trial basis, al-
most without exception, did not show the telltale negative correla-
tions between performance on the two tasks that would be
expected with resource switching. While the lack of correlation is
expected of sharing models, this analysis cannot rule out switch-
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not have the event-by-event breakdown for performance on each
plateau and numeral to reveal this.)
In this fashion, this experiment ﬁts the setup for classic
Chaudhuri (1990) results like those found in our Experiment 1. In
sharp contrast however, we found that MAE’s were undiminished
even as less and less effort was given to the plateau task on the
adapting ﬁeld, and were undiminished even in 100% two-back task
conditions, when effort and awareness were completely with-
drawn from the adapting ﬁeld (see Figs. 5 and 6).
When observers fully weighted the adapting dots (100% plateau
task), average MAE across our six observers was 10.10 s, and the
MAE in the fully withdrawn condition (100% two-back task) was
identical, at 10.26 s.
3.3. Adaptation duration control
It is possible that the maximal MAE’s we found in Experiment 1
reﬂect a ceiling effect of sorts. Perhaps ignoring the adapting dots
actually does affect motion processing and would reduce the
MAE, but this withdrawal from the adaptor to the auditory task
was somehow incomplete. If the MAE then were very quick to sat-
urate then any ‘leakage’ back to the adaptor might be sufﬁcient to
generate the maximal MAE’s we observed. We ran a control exper-
iment just to be sure. In this control, we simulated leakage by mod-
ulating the duration of adapting motion during the 30 s adaptation
phase. In one condition, adapting motion periods were variable
(ranging from 4000 to 500 ms) and were broken up by a ﬁxed
500 ms ISI periods of either static dots or a blank ﬁeld (blank inter-
vals provide an even stronger test here, as they allow for more
potential for MAE ‘storage’ over the ISI periods, see Verstraten,Fredericksen, van Wezel, Lankheet, & van de Grind, 1996). In an-
other condition, adapting motion durations were ﬁxed at 500 ms
bursts, with variable ISI’s (ranging from 500 to 3000 ms) again
either of static dots, or a blank ﬁeld.
In all cases, maximal MAE’s only occur with adapting motion
close to the full, unbroken 30 s, all but ruling out explanations
based on leakage (Fig. 7).
4. General discussion
In this study we attempted to divorce the underling visual pro-
cessing resources of attention from the cognitive and conscious
processes—working memory, decision, but especially awareness—
that typically initiate or result from their allocation. Even when
such cognitive supervision is removed—say driving while day-
dreaming—we argue that there remains a context-dependent, ﬂex-
ible shuttling of processing resources between visual stimuli; a
shadow economy of what we term ‘dark attention’. For instance
in our main experiment, observers ignored an adapting ﬁeld of
moving dots, and instead gave their effort to an engrossing audi-
tory memory task. In spite of this, MAE’s were undiminished,
showing that visual attention can indeed ‘go dark’: processing re-
sources were automatically directed to the adapting ﬁeld, without
requiring nor engaging awareness.
4.1. ‘Attention’ without awareness
Aspects of the interplay of attention and awareness are conten-
tious (Koch & Tsuchiya, 2007; Lamme, 2003). It is beyond the scope
of the present experiment to settle this issue deﬁnitively, but we
take our results as strong evidence that processing resources can
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Fig. 5. MAE duration by observer, Experiment 2. This graph shows MAE durations for each of our six observers in single-task control conditions where observers only had to
perform one task during a block of trials (error bars reﬂect standard errors). In the plateau only condition, observers devoted all their effort to the plateau task (which had
observers continuously monitoring the roving luminance of the adapting ﬁeld) and therefore to the adapting ﬁeld itself. In two-back only conditions, observers were asked to
devote all their effort to the auditory two-back memory task. This task competed signiﬁcantly for cognitive and conscious resources with the plateau task (as results in Fig. 4
show). Even under fully withdrawn conditions, when observers gave full effort to the two-back task and ignored the adaption motion ﬁeld, MAE’s were undiminished.
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block of trials (i.e. ‘give 100% of your attention to the plateau task’; ‘give 90% to the
plateau task and 10% to the auditory two-back task’; ‘50/50’; ‘10/90’; and ‘100%
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instructions, even though they resulted in dramatic shifts in performance and
awareness between the two tasks (see Fig. 4).
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other evidence, as in reports of cueing at work in individuals with
blindsight (Kentridge et al., 2004), or the signiﬁcant tilt aftereffects
induced by an adapting patch that has been rendered indiscrimina-
ble due to the crowding of ﬂanking patches (He & Cavanagh, 1996;
Montaser-Kouhsari & Rajimehr, 2005). Even in the relatively cir-
cumscribed domain of attention and the MAE, there is converging
evidence to support this independence. For example, Blaser, Papa-
thomas, and Vidnyanszky (2005) performed a study where they
showed that color-contingent MAE’s were undiminished even
when the adapting motion was invisible (see also Whitney & Bress-
ler, 2007). In one condition, the adapting stimulus contained a
rightward ﬁeld of red dots and a leftward ﬁeld of green dots, slid-
ing transparently over one another. In another condition, dots were
‘locally paired’ such that every rightward red dot was on a collision
course with a nearby leftward green dot; in this case the motion
‘canceled out’ perceptually, and the adaptor appeared as a motion-
less ﬂicker. MAE’s were identical in both cases. This is strong evi-
dence that the underlying processing resources—dark attention—were allocated without direction, since in the invisible-adaptor
condition there was simply no relevant target for executive control
or awareness to latch onto (while in the transparent condition,
either or both of the clearly visible adapting motion vectors could
be engaged).
4.2. Competition for dark attention
To what extent dark attention inﬂuences, for instance, the MAE
depends in part on how much competition there is between the
adapting ﬁeld and other stimuli. Indeed, the magnitude of the
MAE in our experiments was manipulated by the nature of an
alternate task. In some contexts there is competition, for instance,
an RSVP task at ﬁxation (our Experiment 1; Chaudhuri, 1990; Re-
zec, 2004), where dark attention targets the RSVP characters at
the expense of the adapting ﬁeld, resulting in reduced aftereffects.
Similarly, in a recent study that follows from Lavie’s (1995) ‘per-
ceptual load’ model of attention, Bahrami et al. (2008) found that
the extent of adaptation to an oriented patch—which, critically,
was masked from awareness—was determined by the perceptual
demands of a concurrent visual task. (It is important here to differ-
entiate what we are calling dark attention from various invocations
of ‘preattentive’ or non-attentive visual processes (Braun & Julesz,
1998; Braun & Sagi, 1990; Moray, 1959; Neisser, 1967; Schneider &
Shiffrin, 1977; Treisman & Gelade, 1980; VanRullen et al., 2004;
Wolfe et al., 1989). Such processes are understood as mandatory,
while dark attention is ﬂexible.)
Given this, alternate tasks in non-visual modalities (Duncan
et al., 1997; Treisman & Davies, 1973) should not affect the MAE,
as they will not compete for visual processing resources. This, of
course, explains the disparity in Wolhgemuth’s (1911) and Chau-
dhuri’s (1990) results, as well as the difference in results between
the present study’s Experiment 1, which used a visually presented
two-back task, and Experiment 2, which used an auditory two-
back task. There is additional converging behavioral and neuro-
physiological evidence that shows greater modulation of the
MAE and related cortical activity when ‘attention’ is diverted to a
visual as opposed to an auditory task (Ciaramitaro & Boynton,
2007; Rees, Frith, & Lavie, 2001). (However, this interaction with
modality is still not completely understood. Attention can modu-
06
12
18
ba
se
 lin
e
40
00
35
00
30
00
25
00
20
00
15
00
10
00 50
0
 
MAE 
duration
(seconds)
Adaptation duration (msec)
with 500 msec 
adaptation 
ISI’s
0
6
12
18
ba
se
 lin
e
50
0
10
00
15
00
20
00
25
00
30
00
Blank field
Static field
Blank field
Static field
MAE  
duration
(seconds)
Adaptation ISI (msec)
with 500 msec 
adaptation 
durations
Fig. 7. Effect of adaptation duration on MAE duration. This control experiment was designed to test the possibility that our maximal MAE’s might reﬂect ‘leakage’. Under a
fast saturation model of the MAE, if the cognitive and conscious resources demanded by the two-back task do in fact inﬂuence the MAE, and if some of these resources ‘leak’
back to the adaptor, large MAE’s could result. We tested this by simulating leakage, so to speak, by ﬁlling the adapting phase with periodic bursts of adapting motion, in other
words simulating awareness as ‘turning on’ the adapting ﬁeld. The duration of the adaptation phase was always 30 s, but was broken up into adaptation motion periods
versus ISI periods in two ways. The left panel shows MAE durations when the 30 s adaptation phase is broken up into variable-length periods of adapting motion (ranging
from 4000 to 500 ms) separated by ﬁxed 500 ms ISI’s of either a static ﬁeld or a blank ﬁeld; the results from blank ﬁeld conditions are even a stronger test, as these potentially
allow for more aftereffect ‘storage’ (Verstraten, et al., 1996) during the ISI. The right panel shows MAE durations when the 30 s adaptation interval is broken into ﬁxed 500 ms
intervals of adapting motion separated by variable-length ISIs (of either a static or blank ﬁeld). As can be seen from both of these graphs, the MAE is very sensitive to
adaptation duration: maximal MAE’s only occur with adapting motion close to the full, unbroken 30 s (‘baseline’). This all but rules out maximal MAE’s coming from any
leakage during withdrawn conditions.
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(Shomstein & Yantis, 2004), and there have been results showing
that MAE duration (Houghton & Macken, 2003) and cortical activ-
ity in visual area MT+ are attenuated by attention to an auditory
task (Berman & Colby, 2002)).
Interestingly, there are cases where prima facie ‘competing’ de-
mands do not diminish the processing of other stimuli. Feature-
based attentional spreading is a good example, where neural re-
sponses and adaptation processes can be inﬂuenced in regions of
the visual ﬁeld that are not willfully attended (Arman et al.,
2006; Melcher et al., 2005; Saenz et al., 2002; Serences & Boynton,
2007; Treue & Martinez Trujillo, 1999; Treue & Maunsell, 1996).
The results of Arman et al. (2006) are especially illustrative here.
There observers directed ‘attention’ to a moving ﬁeld while MAE’s
were measured from an secondary adaptation stimulus in an ig-
nored region of the display. This stimulus yielded stronger MAE’s
when the target of attention was a similarly moving ﬁeld, as op-
posed to when it was an oppositely moving one. In what seems
at ﬁrst blush paradoxical, attention could be withdrawn from an
adapting stimulus, yet the result was not a reduction in the MAE
but an enhancement. (This again highlights the inadequacy of the
term ‘attention’. One can speak of devoting ‘attention’ to the target
adaptor and withdrawing it from the secondary adaptor, but this
use includes the manipulation of resources that are apparently epi-
phenomenal to the MAE (e.g. awareness) while failing to ade-
quately capture the manipulation of actual processing resources.
What really determined whether processing resources were de-
voted to the secondary adaptor or not was determined by ‘context’:
the motion direction of target adaptor.) This result dovetails nicely
with other results, including Chaudhuri’s less discussed second
experiment (Chaudhuri, 1990), where ‘attention’ was withdrawn
to a color discrimination task, but where the to-be-judged colors
were part of the adapting ﬁeld itself: MAE’s were undiminished.
‘Cross-attribute’ (Sohn et al., 2004) spreading ensured that what
we term dark attention was devoted both to the color and the mo-
tion of the moving ﬁeld.‘
5. Conclusion
The distinction we emphasize here between visual awareness
and underlying visual processing resources owes much to earlier
attention models (Folk, 1992; Neisser, 1967; Schneider & Shiffrin,
1977; Lavie, 2006; Braun & Julesz, 1998; Pashler, 2001; VanRullenet al., 2004). Exploiting this distinction helps illuminate the rules of
unsupervised resource allocation (what we call ‘dark attention’),
but also if awareness as well as other cognitive processes can be
teased away from, say, a motion stimulus without diminishing
its power to yield a MAE, then such an arrangement could provide
for cleaner behavioral and neurophysiological studies.
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